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Nhi Hoang Thuc Nguyen 
Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Contemporary Vietnam: Constructing Nationalism, New 
Democracy, and the Use of “the Other” 
The South China Sea (SCS) territories are disputed between seven countries: Brunei, 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. This has long been a significant 
geopolitical flashpoint in contemporary international relations and politics. Located between the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans, the SCS occupies a strategic position; it serves as a maritime corridor 
through which passes one-third of global maritime trade, worth over $5 trillion, of which $1.2 
trillion goes to or from the United States each year (Ratner 2017). Furthermore, the SCS is 
replete with oil, gas reserves, and vast fishing grounds. Its fisheries produce 12 percent of the 
world’s annual catch, and it provides energy and food for Southeast Asia’s 620 million people. 
As a result, the SCS is a desirable gem over which Southeast Asian countries and China have 
been fighting at the risk of blighting economic partnerships. China—as a rising global economy, 
with growing military strength, a greater sense of its global role, and a more robust sense of 
nationalism since the Western financial crisis in 2008—has claimed most of the territory of the 
SCS. Its “nine-dash line,” designating the territory it claims for itself, would ostensibly grant 
China sovereignty over 80-90% of the SCS (Yahuda 2013). Moreover, the Chinese navy’s 
aggressive moves in international waters, including damaging and sinking foreign vessels, also 
heighten the enmity between itself and its territorial rivals. Despite the fact that the seven 
nations’ claims overlap, in general the struggle is conceived as principally between an 
aggressively expansive China versus the other six claimants.  
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Vietnamese people and politicians have expressed strong opposition to China’s expansive 
power and aggressive acts on the East Sea (the Vietnamese name for the SCS), especially the 
Spratly and Paracel Islands. In the summer of 2014, when Vietnamese newspapers announced 
that China’s Haiyang Shiyou 981 drilling platform was illegally moving into waters near the 
disputed Paracel Islands and within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), many 
Vietnamese people, from north to south, flooded into the streets to protest China’s illegitimate 
actions (Panda 2014). People held banners and shouted out slogans to express their discontent 
with the Communist Party of China (CCP)’s move, and to pressure the Vietnamese Communist 
Party (VCP) to implement more decisive action in the East Sea. Starting out as peaceful street 
protests, the campaign later degenerated into violence. A 67-year-old woman burned herself in 
front of the Reunification Palace in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) on May 23rd (C. Nguyen 2014). 
Her paraphernalia bore slogans such as “Demand unity to smash the Chinese invasion plot” and 
“Support Vietnamese coastguards and fishermen” (Associated Press in Hanoi​ ​2014). Later, mobs 
of Vietnamese workers in Chinese factories attacked their Chinese peers and managers and 
looted goods and property (Kaiman and Hodal 2014). Similar violent outbursts severely 
damaged the infrastructure of those companies and created fear among not only 
Chinese-affiliated companies, but also those from Singapore and Taiwan who could be mistaken 
as Chinese in Vietnam (​BBC News​ 2014). There were at least 15 foreign-owned factories set on 
fire and hundreds of casualties in the upheaval.  
On July 12, 2016, a fiery upheaval broke out on Vietnamese social media when an 
international tribunal in The Hague ruled against China and in favor of the Philippines, declaring 
that Beijing violated codes of conduct governing international waters in the SCS (Perlez 2016, 
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Tong 2016). Despite the fact that the Filipino and Vietnamese claims overlapped, it seemed like 
no Vietnamese really paid attention to this detail. Instead, many Vietnamese cheered and fervidly 
congratulated the Philippines on its victory against China (Bùi-Tín 2016). This event also 
triggered many Vietnamese to recall their resistance to the CCP’s expansive power and 
aggressive acts on the East Sea. On Facebook, many users changed their profile avatars to a 
picture of a pair of scissors cutting the “​đường lưỡi bò ,” the “cow-tongue shape,” of the Chinese 
nine-dash line territory claim. This image represented Vietnamese people’ rejection of the CCP’s 
territorial claim on the East Sea. In addition, the Vietnamese netizens recalled the past incidents 
of Chinese naval troops attacking Vietnamese boats in the waters near the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands. They also initiated their own anti-Chinese media campaign by using pejorative language 
to censure Chinese citizens and celebrities’ complicity in supporting their government’s 
aggression (Tong 2016). For instance, Thanh Loc Nguyen—a well-known Vietnamese actor and 
celebrity—called for a boycott of Chinese culture and entertainment, rebuking renowned Chinese 
celebrities who supported the CCP’s political acts (2016). Another famous celebrity and TV 
host, Tùng Leo, commented on Loc’s status, “I used to study abroad in China but I will definitely 
never speak Chinese. I just want to be Vietnamese.” Following Tùng, an ordinary netizen 
commented, “I used to have three books of ​Romance of the Three Kingdoms  ​(​Tam Quốc Diễn 1
Nghĩa​), but now forget about reading them.”  
In the mainstream media, many Vietnamese channels announced that they would stop 
making Vietnamese subtitles for Chinese movies to protest Chinese celebrities who “use[d] their 
influences to promote political propaganda.” Binh Thuan channel halted its broadcast of a 
1 ​Romance of the Three Kingdoms​, written by Luo Guanzhong, is a renowned 14th-century Chinese 
historical novel and a popular piece of literature in Vietnam. 
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Chinese movie named ​Tân Bến Thượng Hải because the actors and actresses in the movie 
objected to the results of the Hague case (Dang 2016). The situation seemed to get more intense 
when Tung Tran, a member of Microwave, a famous Vietnamese rock group, published a long 
post on his Facebook wall to demand that a war be waged against China (2016). To him, a war 
was a concrete act to prove the strong will and active resistance of contemporary Vietnamese 
people against the aggressive moves endorsed by Beijing. In his caustic tone, he felt that the 
VCP had not acted strongly enough to oppose China. He pointed out that it was an appropriate 
time to show Vietnamese patriotic spirit, to call for the revival of traditional Vietnamese values 
of heroism, and to establish a resistance to China to counter its coercive and ignoble maneuvers 
in the East Sea. 
In Vietnam, besides the contemporary East Sea dispute, the most common answer for the 
root of anti-Chinese sentiment is the long-term inimical history between Vietnam and China. 
Sinophobia—the antipathy to Chinese people and cultural influences—is framed as not a recent 
phenomenon but a recurring pattern, an essentialist historic sentiment which many Vietnamese 
construct their identity upon. Anti-Chinese sentiment reminds Vietnamese of their heroic 
tradition, glorious past, and indomitable ancestors who could repeatedly defeat the powerful 
Northern enemy and push back their territorial and cultural invasion. Therefore, anti-Chinese 
sentiment is commonly accepted as a natural consequence of the past tension and present 
lingering political conflicts between the two countries. 
In this essay, I attempt to explain the inflammation of anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnam 
beyond the historical explanation reconfigured by the VCP. While propagandistic materials 
introduced by the VCP indeed play a central role in invoking modern Sinophobia, I suggest that 
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the popularization of social media and new actors are also indispensable vehicles for intensifying 
the anti-Chinese sentiment in contemporary Vietnam. These emerging new actors force us to 
rethink conventional nationalism models, where the state monopolizes national sentiment. The 
popularization of internet, social media, and high-tech devices brings about new discursive 
spaces for people to participate and create their own knowledge content. As technology 
restructures the power relationship between state and internet users, it enables unauthorized, 
uncensored content to gain certain legitimacy and become popular. Albeit opposing each other, 
both official and unofficial actors deploy the anti-Chinese discourse, perpetuating and amplifying 
the Sinophobic sentiment to serve their own political purposes. The consequence, however, is the 
elevation of ethnic tension, cultural derision, stereotypic labeling, and even small-scale clashes in 
the contemporary Vietnam.  
I have identified new elements which participate in the re-production of anti-Chinese 
sentiment besides the VCP in contemporary Vietnam: the proliferation of social media and new 
actors. From here, my paper focuses on deconstructing the block of anti-Chinese sentiment, 
which is usually portrayed as a natural consequence of an ingroup/outgroup tension, a 
phenomenon with a documented genealogy, a repeated historical sentiment, or a product of 
conventional nationalism maneuvered by a “totalitarian” Communist party. In contrast, the 
rapidly rising anti-Chinese sentiment in contemporary Vietnam is a recent phenomenon, whose 
scale and intensity are unprecedented, whose reproduction and amplification cannot be explained 
by a unidirectional model of either traditional nationalism, or the hypodermic needle effect  ​of 2
2 According to Turow (2014:33), hypodermic needle approach is an idea that media messages “persuade 
all people powerfully and directly (as if they were hit by a bullet or injected by a needle) without the 
people having any control over the way react.” 
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media and political propaganda on its purportedly “docile” population. I argue that the 
anti-Chinese sentiment in contemporary Vietnam is a socio-political product triggered by the 
official actors and amplified by the unofficial actors and is an instrument deployed to serve 
different actors’ social and political goals. 
METHOD 
Dr. Alfred Montoya and I conducted two-months of fieldwork and archival research in 
HCMC and Nha Trang (Khánh Hoà province), Vietnam. We interviewed 20 young, 
college-educated and Kinh-ethnic people from the age of 22-28, mainly in HCMC. We found the 
interviewees through the snowball method, a sampling technique where our respondents 
introduced us to their friends or colleagues for more interviewees. We selectively chose this 
sample group because young, college-educated, middle-class Vietnamese are more likely to get 
access to social media. Furthermore, we also interviewed a four middle-aged and older ethnic 
Chinese people to learn about their lives under both the Republic of Vietnam and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam. We had informal conversations with local residents in HCMC and Nha 
Trang to get a sense of the prevailing local attitudes toward China (the government and 
nation-state) and mainland Chinese people.  
We spent more time in HCMC, the largest economic and financial hub in Vietnam, and did 
most of the in-depth interviews there. Because HCMC is a cosmopolitan place where people 
come from many parts of Vietnam, we hoped to gather more diverse opinions here. Another city, 
Nha Trang, famous for its coastal tourism, drew our attention for two main reasons. First, there 
were popular complaints in HCMC about the concentration of Chinese tourists in Nha Trang, 
which invoked both discomfort and insecurity about Vietnam’s sovereignty. In the words of 
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some of our informants, the influx of Chinese tourists to the popular resort destination 
represented an “invasion” of Vietnam by China. We traveled to Nha Trang to to interview local 
Vietnamese merchants and service-industry workers about their thoughts about the mainland 
Chinese. We wished to verify for ourselves whether or not Chinese tourists acted like how the 
media and our HCMC informants reported. Second, both the Paracel Islands and Nha Trang 
belong to the Khánh Hoà province, where there were many museums which helped us begin to 
understand the VCP’s military activities and propaganda in a place supposedly inundated with 
Chinese tourists. 
Since discussing domestic politics in public is sensitive in Vietnam, many of my 
interviewees refused to be recorded. Therefore, I mainly took hand notes to document the 
informants’ responses. I specifically paid attention to my informants’ language choice and how 
that reflected their perspectives and emotions. I then translated their answers to English scripts. 
In addition to fieldwork and interviews, I did archival works on Vietnamese journalistic 
publication in the past 10 years. I also collected and interpreted PEW data to corroborate my 
central argument with quantitative data. 
CHARACTERIZING THE ANTI-CHINESE SENTIMENT IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
VIETNAM 
Vietnam and China are two out of the five remaining countries led by a Communist party. 
Despite the expected communist fraternalism, the two polities in fact have a problematic 
diplomatic relationship. According to data of Pew Research Center in early 2017, compared to 
people from other surveyed countries, Vietnamese had the least favorable view for China (88%) 
(Wike 2017). Similar data appears in an Asian Barometer (2016)’s survey on the regional 
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perception of China in 2015: Vietnam was one of the Asian countries whose people were the 
least positive about China’s influence. Many Vietnamese officials acknowledge the extreme 
animosity against the Chinese in the 21st century. Duong Quoc Trung, a member of Vietnam’s 
National Assembly and editor of the magazine ​Past & Present​, comments, “[Anti]-Chinese 
sentiment among ordinary Vietnamese continues to grow” (Sullivan 2015). The British BBC 
journalist Bill Hayton also documents this widespread enmity for Chinese on an everyday scale 
in the book ​Vietnam: Rising Dragon​ (2010). He illustrates the disharmony by how commonly 
Vietnamese use the pejorative term “chink” (​“ba tàu"​) to refer to the Chinese (188). 
Before exploring how this sentiment developed, I want to explain the differences between 
what I refer to as “anti-​China​” and “anti-​Chinese​” sentiment. The former is characterized by 
animosity against a nation-state, a political or economic system, and/or its leaders that proceeds 
from political or economic discontent or real or perceived unfair arrangements or aggression. 
The latter refers to a set of negative characteristics, linked to nationalism, ethnicity, and race, that 
results from distorting, labelling, and normalizing pejorative stereotypes of Chinese people and 
culture. Although there is a clear distinction between these two forms of animosity, Vietnamese 
usually treat anti-Chinese and anti-China sentiment as interchangeable subjects. Therefore, 
although I opt to use “anti-Chinese sentiment” in this paper to emphasize the hatred targeting 
Chinese people and culture, it is essential to keep in mind that many Vietnamese see them as 
equivalent. In the contemporary Vietnam, the anti-Chinese sentiment appears to have two main 
characteristics: (1) repulsion against Chinese “incivility,” and (2) apprehension for China 
government’s aggression and purported invasion. 
(1)Vietnamese Repulsion against the Perceived Chinese “Incivility” 
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In my conversations with many Vietnamese people, one of the most mentioned reasons 
why people did not like Chinese was due to the notoriety of Chinese goods in Vietnam. The 
informants used terms such as “cheap” (“​rẻ tiền ”), “shoddy” (​“dỏm" ), “counterfeit” (​“hàng 
nhái”​), “junky” (“​không có giá trị” ), and “toxic” (“​độc hại ”) to describe Chinese merchandise. 
In stores, the Vietnamese traders avoid mentioning China when advertising and selling their 
products. Even in the case when the goods are actually from China, the sellers still prefer to 
fabricate a different country of origin for the products, mostly Vietnam, to avoid condemnations 
(Nguyên Nga 2017). In October 2017, after being revealed to use “fake [silk] made in China” to 
make the products, the renowned Vietnamese garment brand Khaisilk faced vehement backlash 
and boycotting from the Vietnamese people, and eventually was forced to shut down (Anh Minh 
2017). With a similar attitude, my informants disparaged Chinese commodities (e.g. electronics, 
apparels, furniture, etc.) for their low quality and short lifetime. They reprimanded that the food 
poisoning epidemic in Vietnam was wrought by foods from China. The contempt for 
made-in-China products is a prominent characteristic of the contemporary anti-Chinese 
sentiment. 
“Food from China are toxic. Chinese fake products penetrate into Vietnam. It is easy to generalize 
that anything related to Chinese is bad.” (Huệ, personal interview, May 2017) 
 
“I also do not like China’s fake goods and its counterfeit products. I always avoid made-in-China 
food, even though I like the taste of Chinese food in Chợ Lớn [HCMC Chinatown]” (Cordelia, 
personal interview, May 2017) 
Apart from the aversion to Chinese products, my interviews also mentioned how they did 
not like Chinese tourists’ behaviors and characteristics in Vietnam. In ​Luxury and Rubble: 
Civility and Dispossession in the New Saigon​, Harms (2016) interviews the burgeoning 
middle-class Vietnamese residents in a higher-income suburban area called “Phú Mỹ Hưng” to 
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understand their interpretation of “civility.” His interviewees suggest that civility means 
“order[liness]” and possession of a “higher consciousness” (70-72). Likewise, my 
informants—the majority of whom are new middle class—also characterized the Chinese tourists 
as “uncivilized” because they were “obnoxiously loud” ​(“ồn ào”),  messy (​“lộn xộn” ), 
“disorganized” (​“mất trật tự ”), “rude” (“​bất lịch sự ” or “​vô văn hóa”​), ”condescending” (​“trịch 
thượng ”), “backward” (“​lạc hậu ”), and “fogeyish” (“​cổ hủ ”). They usually contrasted the 
“incivility” of the Chinese tourists to the “civility” of the Westerner tourists in Vietnam.  
“Chinese tourists think this [Vietnam] is their land, so they are very condescending and rude to our 
[Vietnamese] people. In restaurants, the more we are silent, the louder they are. That is the way 
Chinese are. They eat and go in groups and are loud and disorderly. They can do whatever they 
want in their country, but they should know it is rude to do that in our country.” (Mai, personal 
interview, May 2017) 
 
“When I traveled, if I saw Chinese [people], I would feel strange (​“kì kì”​). They spoke very loud 
and behaved very impolitely (“​vô văn hoá”​). Chinese flooded to Vietnam to reside. Meanwhile, 
Western people are very gentle and nice.” (Huệ, personal interview, May 2017) 
The informants also had negative views of Chinese enterprises or investors in Vietnam. They 
evaluated Chinese businesses as untrustworthy trade partners, thinking that they exploited 
Vietnamese workers, procrastinated their assigned projects, created low-quality infrastructure, 
disrupted Vietnam’s economy, violated Vietnamese environmental law, and contaminated the 
Vietnamese ecology.  
“Chinese enterprises did not follow the environmental regulations. Because of profits, they 
exploited the law loopholes and destroyed Vietnamese ecology. The consequence from their 
violation which killed fish and shrimp is small. The larger effect is that these poison would 
penetrate to the sea, intoxicating our water and food sources, and affecting Vietnamese race and 
gene” (Kelley, personal interview, May 2017) 
 
“There are a few reasons why I do not like China and Chinese. Here I want to emphasize that I do 
not talk about Hoa people [ethnic Chinese Vietnamese]. As regards what I see on media, I see that 
Chinese factories in Vietnam brutally coerced Vietnamese workers. Chinese traders defrauded 
Vietnamese farmers by ordering the products without taking them or paying them later. Concerning 
my personal experience, Chinese tourists in Vietnam are very loud and lousy. When I work in my 
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company, Chinese clients are really condescending, as if I have to serve them unconditionally once 
I receive their money.” (Ngọc, personal interview, May 2017) 
 
“My hatred for China led to my dislike for Chinese people...The Vietnamese government could not 
see the disadvantages of allowing Chinese investors to be in Vietnam. They did not utilize 
Vietnamese workers, but their own unqualified, low-skilled laborers. They did not create jobs for 
Vietnamese people. Then they married Vietnamese girls, bearing Chinese children to assimilate the 
younger generation.” (Tu, personal interview, May 2017) 
In addition to Chinese products, tourists, and businesses, my interviewees denigrated 
Chinese traditions and cultures. They took Chinese androcentric values and their expansionist 
mindset as examples for the perceived Chinese traditions of backwardness and regression. To the 
interviewees, even though Vietnamese traditions had some overlapping values, these were “bad” 
influences adopted from the Chinese during the colonial time. In other words, they blamed China 
for having invaded Vietnam, imposing a Chinese cultural model, and tainting what had been 
previously viewed as pure, noble, and “civilized” proto-Vietnamese traditions. 
“In terms of culture and history, I do not like Chinese for their androcentric values and their habits 
to invade Vietnam.”  (Ngọc, personal interview, May 2017) 
 
“I dislike both China and Chinese people. I do not want to consume Chinese culture...I do not like 
Chinese androcentric values. I do not want China to be in contact with Vietnam. I do not like 
China’s aggressive territorial expansion. I think Chinese are inferior and cowardly (​hèn hèn​). I 
prefer Western ideology.” (Cordelia, personal interview, May 2017) 
 
(2) Vietnamese Apprehension of the CCP’s Aggression 
Besides the revulsion against the Chinese “backwardness” and “incivility,” my respondents 
also displayed strong fear for the CCP’s aggressive moves on territorial dispute and economic 
neocolonialism. They construed that China’s control of the East Sea and its ownership of major 
investment in Vietnam were its first steps to usurp Vietnam. Some insisted on the eventual 
Chinese invasion of Vietnam because the CCP had significant power over the VCP. They also 
recalled certain events to elucidate the perceived China’s nascent engulfment of Vietnam. One 
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was the notoriety of Chinese food scandals in Vietnam. My interviewees saw the influx of 
Chinese counterfeit and low-quality foods in Vietnam as a CCP’s conspiracy to debilitate 
Vietnamese health and destroy Vietnam “from the inside.” For another instance, my interviewees 
discerned the large number of Chinese investors, products, language, and tourists as a sign of 
budding annexation through economic neocolonialism. 
“China has strategically penetrated its people and culture to Vietnam to assimilate (‘​đồng hoá ’) 
Vietnamese people” (Phong, personal interview, June 2017). 
The interviewees ​abhorred the widespread presence of Chinese tourists or Chinese 
products in Vietnam based on a potential future loss of Vietnamese language, culture, traditions, 
and consequently national identity. ​To the informants, the proliferation of Chinese elements 
suggested a present manifestation of the historical trope of ​mất nước (“losing the country”). It 
means that Vietnamese would (again) fall at the hand of Chinese imperialists and be assimilated 
to Chinese culture and ways of thought.  
Đồng hoá means the way Vietnamese think and behave will be like Chinese. When we are 
“assimilated,” we will have the same mindsets and behaviors like Chinese. We would think 
Vietnam is a part of [China’s] territory. Our behaviors would be as morose as the Chinese, like 
how the news talks about Chinese husbands physically attacking their wives. Our past tradition 
was already assimilated, such as androcentric values. We could no longer cut [its past influence] 
from our tradition. However, we need to preserve our remaining national essence ​(‘giữ gìn bản 
sắc dân tộc’ ).” 
The public memory about a long history of being assimilated to Chinese culture was brought up 
as a central influence of the ways my informants interpreted their concerns for the presence of 
the Chinese elements in Vietnam. To the respondents, accepting Chinese language, culture, and 
people was a step to allow Chinese government to invade Vietnam and subject Vietnamese to 
their rulings. Therefore, the necessity to protect national identity was on par with the complete 
rejection of Chinese influences. 
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“I did not like to study Chinese. I felt like they were ​đồng hoá us.” (Cordelia, personal interview, 
May 2017) 
 
“Now the demand to study abroad and work in foreign companies is popular. Since China[’s 
economy] is developing, those who want to work in Chinese environment has to study its 
language. Those who do not care about China-Vietnam politics will see such study normal. Those 
who care about politics will know this is not a good thing. We have to always remember that 
China has always been invading us. [Requiring us to study Chinese] may be a way which China 
uses to assimilate us. In the past when they invaded us, they tried to assimilate us by forcing us to 
learn their language.” (Phong, personal interview, June 2017) 
 
CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ANTI-CHINESE SENTIMENT 
As I briefly introduced earlier, most Vietnamese see the large-scale antagonism of 
Vietnamese people toward Chinese people as an inevitable continuation of “a-thousand-year 
conflict” with China. The battles of Vietnamese heroes and heroines  who opposed the Chinese 3
rules are standard lessons in the Vietnamese history textbooks for elementary, middle- and 
high-school students. Considering how these historical stories about Vietnam-China conflict 
during dynasty times have prevailed since the 1950s, it is not surprising to see how it is also 
mostly cited to explain the current anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnam. In addition, the Third 
Indochina War between China and Vietnam in 1979-1989 is commonly perceived as a key 
reason for the contemporary anti-Chinese sentiment (Sullivan 2015). During the French and 
early U.S. colonial era, former cooperation between the VCP and the CCP frayed as 
internationalism and communist fraternalism gave way to national interests (Ungar 1987, 
3 For instance, Hai Bà Trưng, meaning “the two Trưng Sisters” (Trưng Trắc and Trưng Nhị) referred to 
the martyred heroines who launched the first (ultimately unsuccessful) resistance movement against the 
Han invaders of the Nam Việt (Nanyue) kingdom in 40 A.D; Ngô Quyền was an ancient hero who freed 
Vietnam from Chinese rule in the renowned battle of Bạch Đằng; Lý Thường Kiệt led troops against the 
Song dynasty and wrote what is considered the first Vietnamese declaration of independence titled 
Mountains and Rivers of the Southern Country​ (“​Nam Quốc Sơn Hà”) ; Lê Lợi was the Vietnamese 
emperor who defeated the Ming forces in 1428; and Nguyễn Huệ the emperor who likewise defeated the 
Qing force in 1789. 
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Womack 2006). Between 1952 and 1975, the CCP sent money, weapons and advisors to the 
VCP. Vietnamese leaders compared Vietnam’s comradeship with China “as close as lips and 
teeth” (​“gắn bó như môi với răng” ) (Womack 2006:163). In spite of the cordial veneer of the 
relationship, budding discontent later engendered uncontrollable conflict and violence (​Nhà Xuất 
Bản Sự Thật  1979). The VCP officials felt frustrated at the perceived paternalism of their 
Chinese advisors, as well as China’s growing relationship with the U.S., the Vietnamese enemy. 
Moreover, Vietnam’s partnership with the Soviet Union and its intervention in Cambodian 
affairs in 1978 provoked military action against its northern border by China, escalating 
insecurity and tension. The 1979 upheaval deeply ruptured the relationship between the two 
countries, whose historical lesson created a centric reason for Vietnamese leaders to degenerate 
the image of China.  
In the 21st century, the contention over the East Sea with the CCP is the main 
explanation for the contemporary anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnam. This political flashpoint 
sustains and provides “evidence” for a long-standing historical conflict between the two polities. 
Here, it is important to reiterate that the historical conflict is a narrative crafted by the VCP for 
the purposes of restoring national solidarity. The manufactured history provides a lens through 
which these contemporary events are understood in. In other words, despite the VCP’s 
questionable narrative of ancient anti-Chinese sentiment,  these events support the narrative and 4
are seen as a continuation of it in the present day. In 2011, the Chinese patrol vessels cut the 
cables of a Vietnamese ship which was exploring for oil and gas (Ratner 2017). In 2014, the 
4 Neither Vietnam as a political nation-state nor Vietnamese citizen-identity was yet formed during the 
proposed “origins” of this conflict. Therefore, although there was sporadic conflict between the people 
who occupied the territories which we now refer to as “Vietnam” and “China” state, it was not defined as 
a binary conflict between two cohesive nations or “citizens.” 
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Chinese state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation moved its oil rig into 
Vietnamese-claimed territory Spratly Islands (Panda 2014). Since the early 21st century, the 
Chinese government has built artificial islands on the East Sea to claim territory and later 
“transform[ed] them into advanced military bases, equipped with airfields, runways, ports, and 
anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems” (Ratner 2017). These provocative, spontaneous and 
not-yet-negotiated acts upset many Vietnamese who have long seen the Spratly Islands as 
Vietnam’s property, and the acts only reaffirm their assumed negative views on the Chinese. 
“Trường Sa and Hoàng Sa (meaning Spratly and Paracel Islands respectively) belong to Vietnam. 
We have enough evidence since French colonial times, but when we showed them, China said it 
was fabricated. When countries want to deal with territorial dispute, negotiation should be the 
way, but the 981 oil rig incident showed that China did not want to solve the problem in this 
rational way. When the Philippines won the case against China, Chinese online users said that the 
world banded together to attack China. They said that they would never go to the court because 
the world was bullying their country” (Chung, personal interview, May 2017). 
 
“When I was a child, I did not have a bad impression of China. But when I grew up and knew 
more truth, I had more of a bad impression for it. Firstly, the mindsets of Chinese leaders, through 
centuries, have coveted to invade other countries and our country. Secondly, they illegitimately 
claimed the lands on Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa as if they were their own. For example, on 
Chinese-made globes they marked Biển Đông (the East Sea) as their property. The map on 
China’s passport encapsulated our whole claimed maritime region. They built cities and sent 
people to live on Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa. Besides, they also agitated our government, which 
went against the past motto “​Anh em 16 chữ vàng ,”  “​Môi hở răng lạnh ”  (Ngọc, personal 
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interview, May 2017). 
It is commonly accepted among Vietnamese historians and scholars to correlate the 
long-standing political dispute between Vietnam and China with anti-Chinese sentiment in 
5 The interviewee referred to the Vietnam-China’s diplomatic slogan of “​changqi wending, mianxiang 
weilai, mulin youhao, quanmian hezuo​” (“long-term stability, future orientation, good neighborliness and 
friendship, and hollistic cooperation”). These 16 words indicate the fraternal relationship and bilateral 
affinity between Vietnam and China. Here, the interviewee was mocking this pronouncement because 
CCP’s aggressive acts toward Vietnam did not perform the diplomatic initiatives. 
6 According to Hayton (2010:188), in the early 1970s Vietnamese schoolchildren were taught a song 
about Vietnam-China comradeship, with the lyrics: “Vietnam and China are connected by rivers and 
mountains...they are like lips and teeth...when the lips are parted the teeth feel the cold.” Again, the 
interviewee used this phrase to mock the CCP’s foul acts towards Vietnam’s territory. 
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Vietnam as a consistent phenomenon throughout its history, on a so-called national scale. 
However, such view is quite simplistic. I suggest that the revision of long-term antagonism 
against the Chinese “citizens” and culture is rather a recent narrative, originating in the 
development and instrumentalization of Vietnamese nationalistic sentiment against French settler 
colonialism beginning in the 19th century. The next section will look into the anti-Chinese 
events and narratives in different historical periods, and illustrate how the contemporary 
sentiment’s structure and manifestation is unprecedentedly complex. 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN ANTI-CHINESE SENTIMENT: A SURVEY 
FROM DYNASTIC HISTORY TO NOW 
Throughout different historical periods, there is little proof of a consistent or extreme 
Vietnamese hatred for Chinese culture. The public memory of past animosity and resistance to 
Chinese culture, dating back to the Hung Kings’ reigns, was reconstructed by the VCP officials 
and scholars, through collective acts of selecting and curating specific historical accounts to fit 
the new historical narrative. 
Despite the sporadic clashes between the empires who inhabited the domains we now 
refer to as Vietnam and China during the dynastic era, more recent scholarship on this specific 
time frame suggests that there was no homogeneously defiant Vietnamese mindset against 
China’s cultural influences. In fact, ancient Vietnamese elites demonstrated strong favor for the 
Chinese language, literary images and forms. In​ Beyond the Bronze Pillars,​ Kelley examines 
poems composed by Southern Kingdom (the kingdom that was located in what is today northern 
and central Vietnam) envoys on their official trips to China (Kelley 2005). Kelley’s work reveals 
no such hostility on the part of these Vietnamese officials against the Chinese empire, nor does 
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he find any mainstream Vietnamese notions of themselves as distinct from the “Central 
Efflorescence,” the ancient bureaucratic/poetic title for the seat of the Chinese empire (2005: 23). 
Instead, these poems indicated a generally receptive mindset among Southern Kingdom leaders 
to Chinese culture and rule, “depicting a wholehearted affirmation of the world order the 
tributary relationship was based on and of Vietnam’s secondary position in that world” (23). 
These poems, which were viewed as an “authentic presentation of a historical experience in 
premodern East Asia,” repudiated the quite recently constructed trope of a long-standing 
deeply-held animosity and resistance against Chinese influence (39). Furthermore, in precolonial 
times, Vietnamese elites equated historical literacy with a knowledge of specific Chinese texts: 
the ​Five Classics, ​the ​Four Books, ​and chronicles of Han, Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties. 
Chinese language and cultural traditions were the language of civilization itself (Pelley 2002:19). 
This imagined superiority of the Chinese language is also seen in​ one of Ho Chi Minh’s most 
famous poems, ​Vọng Nguyệt , which recites the history of Vietnam from its origins in 2879 
B.C.E. to the revolutionary present, was written in classical Chinese in 1948 (130). ​This 
scholarship insinuates a lack of evidence of a popular conceptual or practical resistance to China, 
and indicates, rather, a preference for Chinese cultural and political forms.  
Even though it is undeniable that there were intermittent conflicts between Vietnamese 
and Chinese dynasty due to territorial or power struggles, the trope of a small country 
consistently repelling the China’s cultural force is a recent, postcolonial, mid-20th-century 
construction (143). Beginning in 1956, during the anti-colonial struggles against the French and 
the United States of the 1950s and 1960s, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)  began 7
7 Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was the country of North Vietnam, established when Vietnam 
was split at the 17​th​ parallel as a result of the First Indochina War. 
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the nation-state construction by reconstructing history. In ​Imagined Communities, ​Anderson 
(1983) explains how nationalism is not a natural inevitable phenomenon, but rather something 
that must be created or “imagined.” Individuals within the newly drawn boundaries of a state do 
not normally experience unbidden solidarity with other individuals within that territory. Elites 
and those in authority utilize communications technologies and print media to create shared 
experience and feelings of solidarity between these people by publishing the same knowledge in 
the same language.  
Likewise, in order for the DRV to legitimize its leadership of the people, as well as to 
gain their support to revolt against France and the U.S., they embarked on the creation of a 
homogenous national identity and national consciousness among people from North to South 
(Womack 181). During the anti-colonial struggles against the French and the United States of the 
1950s and 1960s, in order to emphasize a robust home-grown nationalism, Vietnamese scholars 
from the Institute of History and foreign scholars steeped in postcolonialism attempted to 
“desinicize the [Vietnamese] past,” emphasizing Vietnam as a long-standing, autonomous, 
distinctive civilization (Pelley 2002: 31). They began to re-read ancient artifacts (both those long 
held and those newly unearthed, such as the Đồng Sơn bronze drums) as distinctive 
technological innovations of early Vietnam in order to characterize Vietnamese as ​inventors 
rather than imitators​ of Chinese civilization (Pelley 1998:375). In the public domain, the VCP 
and revolutionary writers coupled the new historical, national-territorial vision with an ethnic 
identification based on a narrative of the Kinh (ethnic Vietnamese) people as unceasingly 
resistant to foreign encroachment. From 1956 onward, the “ancient Chinese invasion” trope was 
used in some propaganda campaigns against American influence in the South (Ungar 1987:602, 
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Pelley 2002:145). The demands of anti-colonial resistance movements (which depend on 
instilling nationalist solidarity), and postcolonial academic constructions of Sino-Vietnamese 
dynastic history produced a vision of an ancient, continuous, ethnically-grounded and even 
“traditional” conflict with China, and set the groundwork for potential mass anti-Chinese 
sentiment in Vietnam.  
The VCP re-narrated Vietnamese history, emphasizing elements of a heroic past that 
fostered national pride. It also increased patriotic content in press and textbooks. For examples, 
heroic stories, mainly those featuring Communist heroes, accounted for more than half of the 
content of First Grade Reader textbooks (Vu 2014). Major Vietnamese newspaper reports were 
dominated by party-related events, highlighting activities which demonstrated the success of 
Vietnam’s socialist society (Thomas 2003). Since the mid-1950s the state has shaped the 
Vietnamese “imagined community” through both hard- and soft-power. In the 21st century, the 
supposed “1000-year-conflict” with China is an indispensable “truth” in history textbooks to 
construct the Vietnamese nationality. 
After the Resistance War against the United States Aggression (or commonly known as 
the Second Indochina War), the VCP was at conflict with the CCP beginning in the 1970s. In the 
context of strong support from an ascendant USSR and Vietnamese confidence in the run-up to 
its dual-front war against Cambodia and China, the VCP publicly declared sovereignty over the 
China-claimed Paracel and Spratly Islands on Dec 30, 1978. After more than a century of nearly 
continuous warfare against global superpowers such as France, Imperial Japan, and the U.S., the 
VCP now felt insecure about its own “brother,” the CCP (Womack 2006). The China-Vietnam 
tacit conflict later degenerated into violence, leading to the 1979 war at the two countries’ 
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border, namely the Third Indochina War. The VCP prompted the 1979 border war by publishing 
books and articles in major newspapers purporting to reveal the misdeeds of their former allies 
the Chinese. A few examples of books include ​The Truth about the Vietnam-China Relationship 
During the Last 30 Year​s ​(“Sự Thật Về Quan Hệ Việt Nam - Trung Quốc Trong 30 Năm Qua” ) 
by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, ​Criticism of the 
Expansionism of Beijing Elite Traitors​ (“​Phê Phán Chủ Nghĩa Bành Trướng và Bá Quyền Nước 
Lớn Của Giới Cầm Quyền Phản Động Bắc Kinh ”) by the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, 
The Borderland Problem between Vietnam and China​ (“​Vấn Đề Biên Giới Giữa Việt Nam và 
Trung Quốc ”) by the state-controlled Truth Publisher (or Nhà Xuất Bản Sự Thật).  
This open conflict marked the onset of modern Vietnam-China tension, paving the way 
for the anti-Chinese feeling in Vietnam to spark and run amok. One of the first large-scale 
repressive activities against the ethnic Chinese was initiated by the VCP during this period of 
time. The 1979 border conflict with China resulted in “the most systemic governmental attempt 
to destroy or expel an entrepreneurial minority [or the ethnic Chinese]…, as relations between 
Beijing and Ha Noi broke down” (Chirot and Reid 1997:61). Earlier, after the reunification of 
the country under a socialist one-party state in 1975, the Communist Party of Vietnam had 
pursued an aggressive policy targeted the Hoa people through confiscating Hoa’s properties, 
based on claims that these citizens represented an incorrigible exploitative comprador class. 
However, the 1978-79 political conflict with the CCP added more tension on the class conflict, 
causing the VCP to suspect the Hoa people loyalty to the Party. The ethnic Chinese had to face 
“the double prejudice against them as potential fifth columnists and as bourgeois” (61). As a 
result of this deprivation of livelihoods, millions of Hoa people, mostly in Southern Vietnam, felt 
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pressured to leave Vietnam and became boat people. The number of Hoa people both in Northern 
and Southern Vietnam dramatically decreased during this period of time. These events signaled 
the rise of anti-Chinese sentiment in contemporary Vietnam, although the latter is characterized 
more by the enmity of mainland Chinese, not ethnic Chinese. 
The 21st-century anti-China sentiment in the contemporary is mostly organized around 
the East Sea dispute. With different tactics, the VCP has played a significant role in 
propagandizing the idea of Vietnamese sovereignty over these remote, tiny atolls and spits of 
land, as well as generating the idea that protecting the islands is tantamount to protecting 
Vietnamese society itself. Awareness of Vietnam’s sovereignty over the East Sea is also 
generated through imaging and messaging in public billboards, and in institutional “hidden 
curricula” (e.g. textbooks, maps of Vietnam which entail and title the islands). When Dr. 
Montoya and I visited Institute of Oceanography in Nha Trang, we saw that the institute spent its 
front section and another large room to exhibit pictures, maps, and artifacts that evinced 
Vietnam’s long-standing ownership of and affiliation with the islands. The institute displayed 
maps of Vietnam dating from the Nguyen Dynasty which demarcated the islands as Vietnamese 
territory, and exhibits devoted to French colonial scientific maritime expeditions. These 
materials suggested long-term serious academic research by the Vietnamese (though the exhibit 
mainly emphasized an early 20th century French research expedition) on the region (even before 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 1947). The museum’s curators utilized the 
language of science, as well as historical academic research interests (rather than military or 
economic interest) in the islands, to emphasize Vietnam’s claim to the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands. 
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The VCP’s propagandistic activities are also prominent in the official media arena. 
Censored and controlled by the VCP Ministry of Information, the official media play an 
important role in perpetuating the anti-China and anti-Chinese narrative. They propose that the 
VCP takes a strong stand against China’s aggressive expansion on the East Sea. They admonish 
Chinese government for promoting of false information regarding the islands. For example, an 
article on ​Vietnamnet​’s website (2016)—titled “Chinese tourists distorted Vietnamese history” 
(“​Hướng Dẫn Viên Du Lịch Trung Quốc Xuyên Tạc Lịch Sử Việt Nam ”)—devotes to exposing 
China’s fabrication of history and violation of political facts (from the Vietnamese perspectives). 
Similar news stories in other official media pages render China as an antagonist acting against 
the Vietnamese interests.  
Besides steering public sentiment by writing critical articles against the CCP’s aggression 
on the East Sea, official Vietnamese journalism also fulfills it through publishing the 
anti-Chinese triggering stories. Entering the keyword “Trung Quoc” (China, or Chinese) in the 
top media outlet, it is not difficult to come across articles which disparage imported Chinese 
foodstuffs, the behavior of Chinese tourists, and the quality of Chinese products. These cannot 
but help make it into popular discourse. When I searched the key term “Chinese” on famous 
news sites in Vietnam such as ​Tuoi Tre News​ or ​Thanh Nien News​ (the two most popular 
journalistic outlets in Vietnam), or other national news media, the majority of stories about 
Chinese people or enterprises contained negative tones. The abundant headlines of popular 
articles that invoke these sentiments relentless popped up: “Petrified By Pork Intestines 
Contaminated By Chinese Chemicals” (“​Ghê Rợn Lòng Heo Tẩm Chất Tẩy Rửa Công Nghiệp 
Trung Quốc ") by Nguyễn Tú on  Thanh Niên News​  (2016), “Chinese People Took Advantage 
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Loopholes to Possess Land in Da Nang” (“​Người Trung Quốc Lợi Dụng Kẻ Hỡ, Sở Hữu Đất Tại 
Đà Nẵng ") by Hữu Khá on  Tuổi Trẻ News  (2016), “Expose the Plots that Chinese Clinics Used 
to Swindle Money from [Vietnamese] Patients” (“​Lật Tẩy Kịch Bản Các Phòng Khám Trung 
Quốc Dùng Để Moi Tiền Bệnh Nhân ”) by Duy Tính on ​Thanh Nien News ​(2017), “Chinese 
Workers Hit and Broke [Vietnamese Workers]’ Legs ” (“​Bị Công Nhân Trung Quốc Đánh Gãy 
Chân​") by HH from ​Báo​ ​Mới  (2012), “[Vietnamese] Farmers Wept Again Because of The Old 
Trick Used By Chinese Traders” (“​Nông Dân Lại Khóc Vì Chiêu Lừa Cũ Của Thương Lái Trung 
Quốc ”) by Trang Ngọc from  Phụ Nữ Online  (2016), “Appalled By The Scene Chinese Tourists 
Vying For Buffet Food in Nha Trang” (“​Hoảng Hồn Cảnh Du Khách Trung Quốc Tranh Nhau 
Ăn Buffet ở Nha Trang ") by Hồng Nam from  Vietnam Net ​(2016). These stories depict an 
unappealing image of Chinese-related people, suggesting that they are harmful and incongruous 
with Vietnamese values, Vietnamese ecological sanity, physical safety, and social order. Hence, 
besides history, textbooks, public exhibitions and propaganda, official media outlets play key 
roles in creating stereotypic tropes and inciting anti-Chinese sentiment. 
THE RISE OF UNOFFICIAL MEDIA 
It is conventional to think that the government is the only producer and manipulator of 
national fear and hate. Western media, news, and scholarship have, for a long time, portrayed the 
Vietnamese government and the VCP as authoritarian, single-unified, and monolithic. This 
specific impression was drawn from the decade-long period when Vietnam was under a subsidy 
system and centrally planned economy. During 1975-1986, the state cornered the production and 
distribution of all products and heavily controlled all cultural and social activities (Elliott 2014). 
Today, despite implementing a free-market economy, the VCP still undeniably maintains control 
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over much of the media and news outlets, engages in political messaging typically considered 
propaganda, and plays an oversized role in the general educational system (Hayton 2010). Its 
past and enduring heavy influences in many aspects of Vietnamese life easily makes Western 
media identify the government’s centrality in promoting and manipulating messages. The spread 
of messages, information, and sentiments (specifically targeting hatred at an outgroup to restore 
nationalism) is misconceived as a top-down model from the government to the people, and 
people would unconditionally accept these messages. This paper attempts to challenge this 
popular unidirectional model of messages and refute the conventional notion that the Vietnamese 
government is the only generator and disseminator of anti-Chinese sentiment. I argue that the 
appearance of new interests (e.g. demand for speech democracy and increasing civil 
participation) and new unofficial actors (e.g. media users, bloggers) also take roles in amplifying 
anti-Chinese hatred in contemporary Vietnam.  
It is possible that the top-down model of information could apply to the period of 1975 to 
1986, the period prior to the economic renovation (“​đổi mới ”) in the mid-1980s. During this 
time, Vietnam was still a closed country with a centrally-planned economy. Media not 
sanctioned by the Party were not available in public, and citizens were restricted from public 
participation in political discourse and overt activism.  The VCP monopolized the media, press, 8
and all sorts of public communication; thus, official media was the only form of public 
communication, whose mission was to report events following the Party line. As the centrally 
planned economy and subsidy system began to fail in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 6th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1986 decided to shift to a 
8 This information was provided by Mr. Nguyen Cong Khe, the founder and the former editor-in-chief of 
Thanh Nien News​, which is one of the most popular newspaper in Vietnam. 
25 
“socialist-oriented market economy.” The government abandoned its command economy. 
Vietnam’s new open door “market-oriented” policy allowed free trade and foreign investment 
coming to the country (Elliot 2012). This drastic economic transformation also resulted in many 
social alterations that limited the Party’s voice and standing in certain socio-political matters, 
reducing the VCP’s centrality on communications and disseminations of information and 
messages in the contemporary Vietnam.  
First of the many social changes, the booming economy that offered more economic 
resources and employment opportunities gave rise to a new middle class who were less 
dependent on the Party. Their access to jobs and resources without joining the Party increased 
the independence of certain social groups within Vietnam from the government (Vu 2013). There 
has been a sharp decline in the number of young people joining the VCP since the 1990s (Thayer 
2003). The VCP has more recently encountered challenges in mobilizing the new generation as 
their interests have grown apart from those of the state. Nguyen (2004) reports that Ha Noi 
young people were uninterested in the official pronouncements nor did they feel their impacts on 
their daily lives. Instead, these people cared more about matters that were related to their 
individual lives, such as finding a ‘good’ job, earning money, and achieving success in both their 
professional and private lives in a market-oriented society. The new economy enabled 
Vietnamese exchanges and interdependency with foreign governments, businesses, and persons, 
generating new social formations, solidarities and interests. Because of the decreasing 
dependency on the Party for economic opportunities, Vietnamese people also became less 
interested in the Party’s pronouncements and propaganda (Nguyen 2006). 
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Second, the turn of the 21st century marked the commercialization and growth of internet 
and social media in Vietnam. In the last 15 years, the number of Internet users in Vietnam has 
skyrocketed. According to the current Vietnamese deputy prime minister Vu Duc Dam, in late 
2017, nearly 70% of Vietnamese population are Internet users (Thuy and Minh 2017). Most of 
these Internet users are young, urban, educated and middle class (T. Bui 2016). Even though the 
VCP made some attempts to control the content that was available online (i.e. the VCP once 
attempted to erect a smaller version of the so-called Chinese “Great Firewall”), these attempts 
proved futile (Hayton 2010). The Vietnamese government could not enforce its stringent control 
of information on the online fora. Due to their impossibility to be controlled, the internet and 
social media have changed Vietnam in many significant ways. Now, everyday people can get 
access to the same online content as most people around the world. Perhaps more importantly, 
these platforms offer new venues for production and dissemination of knowledge, news, opinions 
and whole publics themselves. Internet users are not only passive audience, but active creators 
who can generate their own content (i.e. opinions, blog posts, news) and disseminate them in 
increasingly dense, organized and accessible networks.  
The increasing exposure and public scrutiny, however, have created new conflicts between 
the people and the government. The new quasi-democratic atmosphere makes state censorship 
and the opacity of official media more obvious and intolerable. News media consumers become 
more easily agitated and frequently frustrated by what they perceive as inadequate and slow 
responses or information from the authorities. The lack of thorough writing subjects in official 
media also makes people prone to unofficial media, whose news comes out much faster and 
proposes topics that audience demands for information. The official media, to a certain extent, 
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seems to lose their upper hand in disseminating the information to the unofficial media (K. 
Nguyen 2014).  9
Many interviewees discerned that official media, controlled by the government, is biased 
and less reliable; thus, they have to read unofficial news to make up for the shortfall of 
information. In my interview with Mr. Nguyen Cong Khe, the founder and the former 
editor-in-chief of ​Thanh Nien News,​ he explained the failure of official media in the context of 
digitization: 
“There are two main ways official news is failing. First, official news usually publishes (sensitive) 
news more slowly than unofficial ones. The former has to wait for a tedious process of censorship 
and instructions from upper-level government. Meanwhile, readers have strong demand for 
sensitive news, specifically political topics, which take longer time to issue the instructions. This 
problem accidentally gives more “advantages” for alternative news [or unofficial media]. 
Newspaper needs to be precise and fast! Second, the content is dry and rigid (‘khô cứng’). For 
example, in the Đồng Tâm scandal, journalists hesitate to talk about the officials getting involved 
because there is a matter of power. Journalism needs to be objective. It needs to talk from both the 
perspectives of ordinary people and officials. However, due to the sensitivity in real life 
relationships, journalists cannot deliver the whole story (‘nói không hết’). This hinders the readers 
from understanding things and discomforts them” (Nguyen Cong Khe, personal interview, Jul 
2017) 
T. Bui (2016) suggests that the ability to freely exchange information on the Internet and 
social media increases citizens’ participation in public and political concerns. Media helps 
everyday Vietnamese, but more specifically activists and organizers, push the boundaries of 
accepted speech. T. Bui cites that usage of terms such as “transparency,” “accountability,” 
“advocacy,” and the practice of “civil society,” which were once restricted, are now becoming 
acceptable (90). One example for the increasing civil participation is the usage of social media as 
9 As Mitchel et al. (2018)’s survey data suggest, vast majority of Vietnamese satisfied with local news 
media. Up to 85 percent of Vietnamese thought that local news outlets do a good job of covering the most 
significant issues. The reason why I suggest the official media is losing its power is because my 
informants thought that reading official news itself is not sufficient. They wanted to read other unofficial 
sources to back up the parts official media refuse to address. 
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a place to call for and organize offline protests. For example, during 2014-2015, when protests 
against China’s aggressive acts in the East Sea spilled into increasing public admonition of the 
government, anti-VCP messages began to spread on Facebook. The website becomes a “de facto 
forum for the country’s growing number of dissenting voices, [playing] a key role in mass 
protests against the state’s handling of an environmental disaster last year” (Wallace 2017). The 
online platform has been a convenient venue for many Vietnamese to join and participate in 
social and political conversations.  
Vietnam is well-known for its past defiant spirits which could defeat powerful imperialist 
forces such as France, Japan, and the United States. Nationalist movements during colonial times 
originated from youth anger and protests against the foreign imperialists. However, nationalism 
in Vietnam has been changing since then. In the current context, local opposition is now targeted 
at the national government and elites for reasons such as corruption, suppression of anti-China 
rallies, evasive responses on Formosa's environmental scandal, economic partnerships with 
China and its Belts and Roads Initiative (Vu 2013). The growing distrust of opaque official 
media and the government (or media manipulators) resulted in a demand for democracy, freedom 
of speech, and so-called “untold” information from the government. With social media’s 
free-of-charge communicative platforms, unofficial media (leftist newspaper/ ​“báo lề trái ”/ “​tin 
ngoài luồng ") seized these opportunities. Here, I define “unofficial media” as sources delivering 
news, information, or knowledge that are not censored by the Vietnamese government. By 
contrast, official media sources are required to have a state license provided by the VCP, and 
conform to the VCP’s information agenda (Hayton 2010). The prominent unofficial media 
writers are usually official journalists who cannot express their stances and ideas in official 
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media (information provided by Nguyen Cong Khe in a personal interview), former VCP 
members who disagree with the initiatives of current leaders, lawyers, artists, Viet Kieus 
(Vietnamese overseas), or any citizens who discontent with the governmental actions (Vu 2014). 
A few unofficial media websites include Việt Tân, Dân Làm Báo VN, Nhật Ký Yêu Nước,  BBC 
Vietnamese​, ​VoA Tieng Viet​, Cafe Kubua (T. Bui 2016). A few popular unofficial writers are An 
Hoàng Trung Tướng, Phương Thơ, Lê Công Định, Trương Huy San, Lê Nguyễn Hương Trà, or 
religious leaders such as Khai Phùng and Chung Nguyễn. On personal blogs or Facebook pages, 
they usually voice concerns over or objections to VCP’s policy, reveal dark, secret political 
backstage stories, propose petitions, and discredit the VCP officials (Vu 2014, T. Bui 2016). 
Many of these actors disapprove with VCP’s governance, seeing it as autocratic, 
non-transparent, and corruptive. Vu (2014) uses the term “new nationalism” to refer to the type 
of nationalism which is not spearheaded by the government or the party leaders against a foreign 
force, but by the people who oppose their own government and favor democracy. In a context 
where digitalization of information provides free, convenient, and unrestrained platform for 
publishing information and knowledge, this “new nationalism” takes advantage of these 
platforms to launch and spread their voice (Vu 2014). The internet serves as a discursive space 
largely outside of government influence, allowing uncensored writers to create their own content 
and fill the information gaps of official media. The rise of unofficial media is rapid, whose 
popularity spiked after a short period of time and captivated a massive number of internet and 
social media users. In 2017, the government’s Facebook website (Thông Tin Chính Phủ) has 
much fewer followers than other unofficial media Facebook (e.g. Việt Tân, Nhật Ký Yêu Nước, 
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Dân Luận). The Vietnamese preference to read news on social media  also allows unofficial 10
media to exhibit their content to a mass audience and garner more influence compared to official 
media. 
THE ROLE OF ANTI-CHINESE SENTIMENT IN SERVING OFFICIAL AND 
UNOFFICIAL ACTORS’ INTERESTS 
I have introduced the rise of unofficial media as an opposition to the VCP and official 
media. This section will look into different ways unofficial and official media use anti-Chinese 
tropes to serve their own political goals and interests.  
N. Bui (2016) investigates 570 Vietnamese newspaper titles in 2014 to explore how the 
VCP managed anti-Chinese sentiment. Her findings show that the Vietnamese government 
mainly used Vietnam’s conflict with China on the East Sea as a tactic to gather and ignite 
nationalism. However, the Party carefully avoided inciting the public’s anger to a point which 
could negatively affect the diplomatic relationship between China and Vietnam. My paper 
extends N. Bui’s findings and details by uncovering the unexpected challenges the VCP had to 
face as a consequence of this political maneuvering.  
Despite the VCP’s historical conflict with the CCP, Vietnamese officials are still obliged to 
maintain a diplomatic relationship with the Chinese government. Since Vietnam is a burgeoning 
economy and one of a few communist countries left in the world, the VCP needs a powerful 
economy and political state like China to invest and bolster Vietnam. Moreover, after Vietnam’s 
acceptance to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007, Vietnamese officials are required 
to stay fluid and flexible in the constantly shifting global economic and political landscape, 
10 ​PEW Research Center suggests that Vietnam ranks fourth in a survey of 38 countries in terms of the 
percentage number of people who get the news from social media (​Mitchel et al. 2018)​. 
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prioritizing economic opportunities over past historical or fleeting contemporary political 
conflicts. The necessity to attract foreign trade partners and economic deals, especially with 
Chinese businesses, mandates the VCP to periodically soften the Sinophobic temperament. As a 
result, depending on the present economic and political relationship between the VCP and the 
CCP, the former adjusts its prejudiced tone against China to manipulate public sentiment. 
Aligning with N. Bui (2016)’s suggestions, I propose that the Vietnamese government is not 
interested in inciting extreme Sinophobia, nor degenerate it into real ethnic clash, or make 
violence run amok. Instead, the VCP’s main goal when deploying the anti-Chinese sentiment is 
to arouse and maintain nationalism, to ensure the citizens’ confidence in the Party, and to restore 
national solidarity, especially at moments when the VCP begins to lose the Vietnamese people’s 
trust. 
The VCP’s shifting of the national discourse on China and the Chinese people​—​from​ an 
irrefutable Vietnamese enemy during the nation-state construction period and after the Third 
Indochina War ​to​ an essential but unpredictable “brother” in the present​—​has been a rough 
attempt. The Vietnamese government’s graceless efforts to mediate between the Chinese as 
“enemy” and “necessity” has put the Party in a controversial position. On one hand, the 
Vietnamese government took the leading role in reconfiguring the public memory of the 
Vietnamese-Chinese relationship in the past, constructing China/ the Chinese people as the “bad” 
enemy, and initiating the anti-China sentiment as a direct result of the Third Indochina War. On 
the other hand, the VCP cements a close tie and cultivates a trading partnership with the CCP. 
Here, the VCP officials struggle to fit a past, fundamental, and even essentialist antagonistic 
view of China/Chinese into the modern, fluid context where China is both an economic partner 
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and a political enemy. To an ordinary citizen who does not ruminate on the complicated, 
ambiguous nature of international relations, in which the boundary between “friend” and 
“enemy” separating countries can be unclear, the ambivalent relationship between the 
Vietnamese government and the Chinese government bewilders them. My informants were 
skeptical of the VCP’s loyalty to the people, because its diplomacy with the CCP does not match 
the state’s rigid depiction of China as a “bad older brother” and a national enemy. The 
interviewees shared that they could not fathom the “actual” relationship between Vietnam and 
China, which made them suspect that the Vietnamese officials are traitors who betray 
Vietnamese citizens and work in favor of the CCP. Their skepticism for the VCP also adversely 
impacted their evaluations of the official media’s credibility. 
Talking about the official media, my respondents shared that the sporadic changes in the 
way the official media portray China baffled them about the true nature between China and 
Vietnam. Specifically, while official media overtly criticize China’s aggressive move on East 
Sea, as well as the unavoidable presence of Chinese tourists, enterprises, and products, the 
Vietnamese government still cements its relationship with China. This hedging diplomacy tactic, 
while comprehensible to the international relations world, confounds a normal citizen. These 
knots of confusion, however, are never answered or fully addressed by the official media, 
leaving loopholes for unofficial media to occupy and attack the government. 
As I mentioned earlier, the unofficial media actors are usually the “new nationalists” who 
contest and object the VCP’s ruling, and who urge for a new democracy for Vietnam. In order to 
delegitimize the VCP’s ruling, unofficial media exploited the loopholes in official media to 
prove the government’s incompetency. Unofficial writers used the same nationalist and 
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anti-Chinese narrative, which was created by the VCP’s founders, to contradict the Party’s 
present activities. For example, on May 12, 2017, Nhật Ký Yêu Nước—a popular anti-VCP 
news outlet on Facebook— published a post to mock the president of Vietnam Trần Đại Quang’s 
visit to Beijing, China. The author pointed out that one day before Mr. Tran’s trip to Beijing to 
talk about the cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative, the CCP’s military had put Chinese 
flags to mark their territories on the Spratly Islands. They ridiculed the VCP for having staunchly 
pronounced their resistant stance against the Chinese aggression on the East Sea, but 
concurrently being lenient to the Chinese military acts on the East Sea and cementing economic 
partnership with the CCP. By exposing the inconsistency in what the VCP had claimed and what 
they actually practiced in the international relations, Nhật Ký Yêu Nước made the Vietnamese 
government look disloyal and unreliable. In addition, many unofficial sources highlighted similar 
historical events to tarnish the VCP. For instance, ​Dân Làm Báo​, a popular unofficial media 
page, cites Vietnamese former prime minister Pham Van Dong’s acknowledgement of China’s 
territorial claim on the East Sea in 1958 as a piece of evidence for the VCP’s disloyalty to the 
nation in the past (Tran 2012).  
Besides evoking political and historical events to fuel Vietnamese resentment of China, the 
unofficial media also publish articles that denigrate Chinese tourists and Chinese products in a 
similar tone to (or sometimes harsher than) the official media. Writers on ​Viet Tan​ page or ​Dân 
Làm Báo​ are not shy about publicly using derogatory terms such as “​tàu​” or “​tàu​ ​khựa ” 
(meaning “chinks”)​ to refer to either the CCP or the mainland Chinese people. By relegating 
Chinese culture and people as a backward and aggressive force, the unofficial media reinforce 
the idea that Vietnamese should stay away from the Chinese leaders, people, and products. From 
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there, they suggest that the VCP’s intimate, diplomatic contact with the CCP is a wrongful, 
unpatriotic, and even reactionary act. By deploying the anti-Chinese sentiment, the unofficial 
media’s main goal is not to declare a physical war or direct tension with China, but rather 
repudiate the VCP’s legitimacy to rule and call for a new Vietnamese democracy.  
As I have elaborated, both official and unofficial media use the anti-Chinese sentiment as a 
tool to manipulate the public sentiment and serve their own social and political interests. On one 
hand, the official media attack the Chinese to arouse national solidarity and sustain the Party’s 
credibility. On the other hand, the unofficial media instrumentalize anti-Chinese sentiment to 
promote an anti-Communist agenda, criticize and delegitimize the VCP’s ruling, and rally 
grassroots campaigns and movements (e.g. the protests against the 2016 Vietnam marine life 
disaster). Despite having different purposes, the two forces—the official media and the unofficial 
media—intentionally adopted the anti-Chinese narratives, and inflamed the anti-Chinese 
sentiment on an everyday level. Their discourse permeates into daily relationships, ways of 
thinking, and conversations. It influences the subjectivity of Vietnamese people, who generally 
in-part construct their identity based upon the antagonism and subordination of “the other” —the 
“barbaric,” “uncivilized,” and “aggressive” Chinese. Thus, the contest of the two political 
forces—using the discourse of “democracy” to justify their existence, activities and to denounce 
the other party—fulfill their duties based on a technique: the construction and generalization of 
the imagined people and things in China’s territory into a category of “the bad other.” This 
action, committed by both official and unofficial actors, reifies anti-Chinese sentiments into real 
fear, dread, prejudice, and even physical violence against the Chinese (and those who are read as 
Chinese) in Vietnam. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored the complex social production of anti-Chinese sentiment. It 
complicates the simplistic top-down model of hate production, challenging the belief that the 
Vietnamese government is the only force which manipulates "its people" against China through 
historical accounts and political propaganda. Instead, unofficial media, with a pro-democracy 
agenda, also play significant roles in perpetuating and inflaming anti-Chinese sentiment for their 
own different social and political purposes. Specifically, due to the limitations of censorship, 
official media fails to thoroughly or responsively address sensational topics, creating gaps and 
holes where the unofficial media occupy, create content, and gain popularity. In order to 
delegitimize the VCP and official media, unofficial media writers use China and the Chinese as 
strawmen to question the Vietnamese government’s loyalty and capability. Unlike the VCP 
which utilizes anti-Chinese sentiment as an instrument to gather national solidarity, the unofficial 
media instrumentalize it as a way to repudiate the VCP’s ruling, and call for democracy and 
“new nationalism.” However, the consequence of this power struggle and media manipulation is 
a surge of anxiety about the Chinese, leading to concrete social tension, everyday ethnic 
prejudice, and the practice of stereotypic labelling in contemporary Vietnam. 
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